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1Carnapian and Bayesian Inductive Predictions
The first part of this thesis is concerned with a general introduction into in-
ductive predictions, and with the development of a logical scheme for these
predictions. This chapter, in particular, discusses two schemes for capturing
inductive predictions, the Bayesian and the Carnapian. The focus of the discus-
sion is on their logical nature. After an introduction into both schemes, they are
reformulated to disentangle the notions of premise and inference. The resulting
picture shows both schemes in the form of a Bayesian logical argument.
1.1 Introduction
A hunting example. The schemes discussed in this chapter are aimed at a con-
ceptual clarification of inductive predictions. Inductive predictions are taken to
be probabilistic statements on future events, given a set of past observations of
events and further relevant knowledge. As an example, take a series of obser-
vations made of a pond in the middle of a forest. We may want to predict the
animals to be observed in or around the pond, and it may be sensible to base
this prediction on the record of earlier animals spotted, and on further knowl-
edge we have of the animals in the forest. The necessity of accurate predictions
is perhaps made more vivid if it is added that we can spot an empty pond, some
tasty ducks, but possibly a hungry tiger, so that we must prepare for hunting
or hiding.
Since we cannot be certain whether the next observation will be of a duck
or a tiger, we naturally attach degrees of belief to these events. For example,
if we have spotted many ducks, we may be tempted to expect spotting more
ducks in the future, based on the supposition that the record of observations is
representative for the numbers of ducks and tigers in the forest. Similarly, if we
know the pond to be a place that is regularly visited by ducks, the initial degree
of belief for spotting a duck must be high. However, because ducks usually flee
from tigers, spotting a single tiger may cause us to expect no ducks for some
time. The two schemes to be discussed in this chapter serve to clarify exactly
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such predictions of uncertain events based on a record of earlier events, data for
short, and other relevant knowledge.
The logic of inductive predictions. Before presenting the schemes, I need to say a
bit more on the kind of clarification that this chapter offers. This is particularly
useful for those readers who have skipped the introduction of this thesis. For
those who have read the introduction, it may serve to connect the introduction
of the thesis to the agenda of this chapter. The two schemes discussed in this
chapter look at predictions as the result of inductive inference. So clarifying
these predictions involves not only a formal expression of the predictions them-
selves, but also of the inductive inference steps leading up to them. A scrutiny
of inference is generally the task of logic, and the schemes are thus concerned
with the logic of inductive predictions.
The fact that the object of the schemes is logic rather than rationality or
decision theory is of importance to the kind of clarification that they offer.
Let me take classical deductive logic to be the paradigmatic case, and the case
that sets the standards. This logic makes a crucial distinction between validity
and truth: valid reasoning need not necessarily result in a true conclusion,
and a true conclusion may follow from invalid reasoning. Logic is restricted to
characterising valid reasoning, and leaves the matter of truth aside. Classical
deductive logic therefore enables us to make valid arguments for the most silly of
claims, for example for the claim that ducks love tigers: if only we assume that
ducks love furry animals, and further that tigers are furry, then the conclusion
that ducks love tigers follows unproblematically. This is not to say that classical
logic holds that ducks love tigers. The logic just relates the premises to a
conclusion, but refrains from telling whether the conclusion is true. It only
claims that if the premises are true, then so is the conclusion.
Now it may be argued that assuming the rules of classical logic to be truth-
preserving or sound comes down to making substantial metaphysical claims,
because it is in a sense a contingent fact about the world that these rules indeed
work. But it carries us too far into the philosophy of logic to follow that line.
Here it is important only to keep in mind the distinction of validity and truth.
It is the particular perspective of validity that is at the core of the clarification
that the schemes in this chapter offer. In the following I attempt to maintain
a strict separation between premises, which the schemes take as input, and the
inferences, which are inherent to the schemes. These inferences must be free of
synthetic assumptions, because, parallel to classical logic, their only task is to
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take us from the premises to the conclusion, in this case the predictions, in a
valid way.
Ampliative premises. The adoption of the logical perspective has some conse-
quences for the way in which the schemes will be characterised and evaluated. It
is sometimes claimed that inductive inference is inherently ampliative, because
the conclusions say more than what the data warrant. For example, on the basis
of a long morning of observing an empty pond, we are tempted to conclude that
we will not see the ducks or the tiger in the afternoon either. This reasoning is
ampliative because the data do not themselves contain such a conclusion. But
in view of the above, I will not say that the inferences of inductive logic are
ampliative, but rather that inductive logic takes more input than just the data.
It also takes as input particular premises on what the data purport to tell us.
In other words, inductive logic as a whole may be called ampliative, but the
ampliativeness resides not in its inferences, but in the fact that the logic takes
not only data as input but also, as it were, ampliative premises. In the exam-
ple, the ampliative premise is that a particular regularity in past observations,
namely there being no ducks or tigers, is projectable onto future observations.
The main point on which the two schemes will be evaluated is precisely on how
they make these ampliative premises explicit.
It may strike the reader as disappointing that a conceptual clarification of
inductive predictions remains silent on the most interesting parts, namely on
what a good inductive prediction is, and what kind of premises good inductive
predictions take as input. I admit that a full analysis of inductive reasoning must
also contain an assessment of the premises and predictive performance, and that
in this sense the present chapter, and more generally this thesis, is incomplete.
One of the main ideas of this thesis is, however, that these questions are separate
ones, and that it makes sense to consider the logic of inductive predictions on
itself, and independently from the justification of its premises or the performance
of its predictions. If a scheme for clarifying inductive reasoning is to function as
a logic, it must in fact be neutral towards any ampliative assumptions we may
want to make. I here side with Howson (2000), who argues that to solve the
problem of induction, we have to provide a logic which tells us how to relate
assumptions, for example on the uniformity of nature with respect to some
predicate, to the empirical data. It is not part of the task of justifying inductive
inference to advise simultaneously about what premises to use.
Deviating from Carnap. Note that this perspective on inductive reasoning dif-
fers significantly from the perspective that Carnap (1950) chooses in his analysis
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of induction. It differs in at least two ways. First, the present discussion focuses
explicitly on logical arguments, and not necessarily on a confirmation relation.
It is quite natural to place the inductive arguments in a larger confirmation
framework, but there is much more to confirmation than is expressed in the
schemes of this chapter, particularly when it comes to the confirmation of sci-
entific theories.
Second, we may say that Carnap deems inductive predictions tautological
once an observation language is chosen. Put more carefully, he provides an
observation language, and then derives so-called logical probabilities over this
language from specific symmetry considerations. These logical probabilities fix
the predictions relative to preceding observations, and are supposed to explicate
valid inductive reasoning. Carnapian inductive predictions are therefore deter-
mined by the observation language and the preceding observations. By contrast,
classical deductive logic enables us to choose premises after a language has been
chosen. In the perspective of this thesis, Carnap therefore delivers the logic of
inductive predictions together with the premises it takes as input.
The following is intended as an improvement on the Carnapian project in
two ways. First, I define a scheme for valid inductive inference, and second, I
provide tools to capture the notion of inductive premise. This latter task extends
to the next two chapters. For this chapter the plan is as follows. In section
1.2 I introduce the formal notions of data, degree of belief, and predictions,
after which I introduce the Carnapian scheme, and the λγ of Stegmu¨ller rule
as a typical example. The Bayesian scheme is introduced in section 1.3. Its
exposition includes a discussion on hypotheses, updating over hypotheses, and
priors. Section 1.4 introduces the notion of a probabilistic model, shows that
both the Carnapian and the Bayesian scheme take such models as input, and
thus sketches a logical picture for these schemes. The Bayesian scheme can then
be seen as a generalisation of the Carnapian scheme.
1.2 Inductive predictions
This section introduces the formal framework for inductive predictions, which is
used in both schemes. After that it defines the simplest of the two schemes for
making inductive predictions, the Carnapian scheme. This scheme is illustrated
with the so-called λγ continuum.
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1.2.1 Observation framework
The framework for characterising observational data is based on set theory.
Such a framework most easily accommodates a characterisation of degrees of
belief in terms of the probability theory of Kolmogorov (1933). I first define a
finite set-theoretical framework based on observation statements, after that a
framework with so-called cylinder sets, and finally an infinite extension of this
latter framework. Both frameworks using cylinder sets are employed below.
Observation language. Let K be a finite set of possible observations at any time,
typically {0, 1, 2, . . . , L} and let qi be a single observation q at time i, so that
qi ∈ K. Define et to be a finite string of indexed observations, et = q1q2 . . . qt,
andKt the t-th Cartesian product ofK, and thus the set of all strings of length t.
Finally, define et(i) to be the term qi in the string et. For example, the possible
observations may be an empty pond, some ducks and a tiger, encoded in the
numbers q = 0, 1, 2, whereby it is assumed that tigers and ducks never appear
together. The observations e6 = 〈0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0〉 then mean that the pond is
empty for three time units, after which ducks settle in the pond during two time
units, only to leave again after that. Thus we have a complete specification of
the finite set-theoretical framework of observations, in which single observations
or finite observation strings are elements in the sets K and Kt respectively.
This framework is finite because it does not include infinitely long sequences
of observations. It may be noted that the finite framework can easily be asso-
ciated with the observation language that Carnap (1950) used. The qi can be
seen as statements that the observation at time i had the result q, and strings
of observations et can be taken as conjunctions of such observation statements.
This chapter, however, does not exactly use such a statement-based framework.
Instead it uses a framework with so-called cylinder sets, denoted with capital
letters. The idea behind this framework is that the notions representing sin-
gle observations and finite observation strings are not individual elements, but
subsets in the set of all infinitely long strings of observations. In defining prob-
abilities over sets representing subsequent observations, this framework is much
more convenient.
Cylindrical algebra. LetK again be the set of all possible observations, and let qi
be a single observation at time i. Define e to be the infinite string e = q1q2q3 . . .,
and Kω the set of all such infinitely long strings. Within Kω, define the set Eett
to be the set of all strings e that start with the string et and may contain any
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infinite string after that:
Eett = {e : ∀i ≤ t (e(i) = et(i))}. (1.1)
Also define Qqi ⊂ Kω, the set of strings e that start with any string ei−1, have
the same result q for observation i and may contain any infinite string after
that:
Qqi = {e : e(i) = q}. (1.2)
In the following, the sets Qqi and E
et
t represent observations and strings of
observations respectively. For the expression Eett I usually omit reference to the
string et for sake of brevity. The small letters qi and et encode the content of the
observations. Note that the numbers and the sets are different mathematical
entities, just as the event of observing q at time i, denoted Qqi , is different from
the content of that observation, namely q.
The sets Qqi can now be collected in an algebra Q0, which consists of all
sets that may be constructed by any finite number of intersections and unions
of these observations. The algebra Q0 will be called an observation algebra.








This also means that Et+1 ⊂ Et, as is illustrated in figure 1.1. The sets Et
are sometimes called cylinder sets. As soon as we make the observation Qqt+1,
the cylinder Et, comprising of sequences e that agree on et and that contain
any infinite string after that, is narrowed down to the smaller cylinder Et+1,
in which the sequences e only diverge after et+1. So the sets Et are really like
nested cylinders. It may further be noted that the observations Qqi , as it is
called, separate Q0: for any pair e 6= e′ there is at least one Qqi for which e ∈ Qqi
while e′ ∈ Qqi . Each infinite sequence, or possible world, e can therefore be told
apart by some observation. Note finally that the sets Qqi and Et can also be
written down directly in terms of the finite framework, as Ki−1qKω and etKω,
which is the notation used by Kuipers (1978).
It is important to be clear on how the finite and the infinite set-theoretical
frameworks for observations relate. An observation result qi is a variable which
can take on a value in K, while an observation Qqi refers to a set of infinitely
long sequences of observations e which have the value e(i) = q in common.
However, when it comes to expressive force, the algebra Q0 of sets Qqi is simply
equivalent to the finite framework with small letters. The so-called σ-algebra





Figure 1.1: Graphical representation of the observation sets Q11, Q12, and E2 as part of a
cylindrical algebra.
of sets Qqi , denoted Q = σ(Q0), is the extension of Q0 that also contains sets
that can only be obtained by infinitely many set-theoretical operations with
elements from Q0. The algebra Q is called the extended observation algebra,
because it is essentially richer than the algebra Q0. In this chapter I employ
only the algebra Q0. The richer algebra Q will be used in subsequent chapters.
1.2.2 Carnapian scheme
Probability assignments representing beliefs. I can now define the formal notions
of belief and prediction in this framework. As suggested, beliefs are represented
by a probability function over the algebra of observations Q0. The probability
function
p[et] : Q0 7→ [0, 1] (1.4)
represents the beliefs of some observer who is given the observations et, that is,
whose empirical knowledge exactly comprises these observations. Every empir-
ical knowledge base et is connected to a unique set of beliefs expressed in p[et].
Note that the functions p[et] are defined over all elements of the algebra Q0,
and conform to the Kolmogorov probability axioms. Popper, Renyi (1970) and
more recently Ha´jek have argued that conditional probabilities are more natural
as basic elements than unconditional ones, and that in fact the axioms must be
rewritten to define probability as a two place function. In view of the later use
of statistical hypotheses, this may be a useful reformulation.
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It is natural to suppose that an observer who has made the observations et
assigns a probability 1 to the corresponding set Et ∈ Q0, that is,
p[et](Et) = 1. (1.5)
This is a particular regularity condition, to which I shall adhere in all of the
following. As will be seen below, it is a stronger condition on the functions p[et]
that they are related by Bayes’ rule, as the above regularity condition follows
from that. However, as it stands now, the representation leaves room for other
relations between subsequent belief states. I come back to the use of Bayes’ rule
in sections 1.3.2 and 1.4.
Inductive predictions. With the above representation of beliefs in place, we can
define inductive predictions. A prediction of some observer given some set of
observations is basically any assignment of a probability to an observation that
is not already entailed or excluded by the data, that is,
p[et](Q
q
t+i) = pr (1.6)
for any i > 0. Since p[et] is a probability function, we have 0 ≤ pr ≤ 1. Most
of the discussion in this chapter focuses on predictions for which i = 1, which I
call direct predictions. Direct predictions concern the observation immediately
following the given observations, for example whether the next observation is of
an empty pond, of ducks, or of a tiger.
With the notion of inductive prediction at hand, we can define Carnapian
prediction rules. As said, the scheme uses the observation algebra Q0 and the
probability functions p[et]. The further component of a Carnapian scheme is a





t+1) = pr(q, et). (1.7)
The valuation of the direct predictions, pr(q, et), can also be called a prediction
rule. Note that pr is a function of q and et, which are natural numbers in K
and strings of such numbers in Kt respectively. The function pr determines a
probability assignment p[et], so we must have∑
q∈K
pr(q, et) = 1. (1.8)
Furthermore, the valuation must be complete, meaning that every combination
of q and et is assigned a value by pr. In chapter 2 this restriction is discussed
in more detail.
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Carnapian scheme. Carnap was the first to study such prediction rules pr
systematically, considering them over a finite observation language containing
the terms et and qt+1. He developed specific prediction rules in his (1950, 1952),
using his notion of logical probability. Stegmu¨ller (1973) eventually derived the





The parameter tq is the number of results q in the sequence et. If for example
K = {0, 1}, and e3 is given by 〈0, 1, 1〉, then t0 = 1 and t1 = 2. The parameter
t is the length of the sequence et, and can thus be called the time parameter.
The special case of λ = L, the number of possible observations q, and γq = 1
for all q is the rule discussed by Laplace, and eventually dubbed the straight
rule by Reichenbach (1948). As Zabell (1982) shows, Johnson (1921) already
derived the continuum as a generalisation of the straight rule.
Rewriting the above expression provides a better understanding of the func-














The λγ rule can thus be seen as a mixture of an initial probability γq for q, and





t = 0 we have tt+λ = 0, so that the initial probability p is determined entirely
by γq. At t = λ the value of θ is just the mean of γq and
tq
t , and for t λ the
import of γq vanishes. Thus λ is a parameter that expresses the willingness of
the observer to learn from the observations.
There is much more to be said on the derivation of the Carnapian prediction
rules from the notion of logical probability. But I will not deal with these
derivations here. The main aim of this chapter is to put forward a rather
different position on inductive logic, while using the basic Carnapian framework.
Apart from Carnap (1950) and the more specific (1952), there are excellent
discussions of Carnapian inductive logic which the reader may consult. The
standard works are Carnap and Jeffrey (1971) and (1980). See Suppes (2002:
190-98) for a quick reference, and Schilpp (1963), Kuipers (1978), and Festa
(1993) for more specific discussions.
This thesis does not use the notion of logical probability, for reasons given
in 1.1 and in the introduction to this thesis. In the context of this thesis, a
Carnapian scheme is therefore characterised by the function pr(q, et). Apart
from the fact that this function must be normalised and must offer a complete
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valuation, any function pr(q, et) is permitted. The function pr may be a Car-
napian rule as defined above, in which case repeated observations of some q
enhance the probability for q’s in subsequent observations. But the function
pr may also express the gambler’s fallacy, in which repeated observations of
some q cause the probability for subsequent q’s to decrease. The Carnapian
scheme, as it is presented in this thesis, does not yet impose restrictions on the
kind of patterns in the observations that the inductive predictions are aimed at.
Considered as such, the Carnapian scheme is just one way of conceptualising
inductive predictions. The next chapter introduces an alternative way.
1.3 Bayesian scheme
The Carnapian scheme is an attractive scheme for capturing inductive predic-
tions. It is simple, and it seems that any prediction rule can be subsumed under
it. The other scheme of this chapter, which I call the Bayesian scheme, is a
bit more complicated. It employs the same framework for observations, but to
arrive at predictions it takes a detour. First it uses Bayesian updating to assign
probabilities to hypotheses on the basis of input probabilities and observations.
The probability distribution over a suitable collection of hypotheses can then
be used to generate inductive predictions.
1.3.1 Predictions from statistical hypotheses
Statistical hypotheses. This section concerns the use of statistical hypotheses
in making predictions. Statistical hypotheses are here taken to be statements
that induce a complete probability assignment over an observation algebra. In
the following, whenever I speak of hypotheses, I intend to refer to statistical
hypotheses of this type. To illustrate, recall the hunting example and consider
the statistical hypothesis h that a tiger is hunting the ducks in the pond just
like we are. This fact may be described by the following set of statements,
namely that the tiger appears with a chance of 12 if ducks are in the pond and
disappears directly after that, that the tiger hides in all other cases, that the
ducks do not appear for a while after the tiger appeared, and that there is
otherwise a constant chance 13 of ducks appearing or staying in the pond.
We can now construct a valuation of probabilities pr[h] that captures the sta-
tistical hypothesis h that a tiger is hunting ducks. We use the above statements
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and the encoding of empty pond, ducks and tiger in q = 0, 1, 2 respectively:
pr[h](1, et) =
 13 if et(t) 6= 2,0 otherwise, (1.11)
pr[h](2, et) =
 12 if et(t) = 1,0 otherwise, (1.12)
pr[h](0, et) = 1− pr[h](1, et)− pr[h](2, et). (1.13)
The above cases cover all sequences et, so that the probability assignment is
indeed complete. Because of prediction (1.13), normalisation is also satisfied.
A single statistical hypothesis prescribes a single prediction rule pr[h] over
the observation algebra Q0. But the Bayesian scheme is designed to deal with
a collection of such statistical hypotheses, minimally two. In the example, take
the hypothesis h1 = h that tigers hunt ducks and the hypothesis h0, stating
that tigers and ducks wander independently, but that ducks appear nine times
more often than tigers, but that the pond is ten times more often empty than
filled with ducks. The above stipulations already specify the probabilities over
the observations according to the former hypothesis, namely pr[h1] = pr[h]. For




10 if q = 0,
9
100 if q = 1,
1
100 if q = 2.
(1.14)
Many other such hypotheses can be constructed. For example, hypotheses may
cover the statement that tigers operate alone, that ducks are reluctant to leave
the pond, that when we see a duck a tiger will appear soon, and so on. As
with Carnapian prediction rules there are only two restrictions. First, the hy-
pothesis must respect the normalisation condition (1.8). And second, they must
each cover all possible preceding observations et, so that they determine direct
predictions over the whole observation algebra.
Predictions from a partition. The Bayesian scheme considers collections of hy-
potheses H = {h0, h1, . . . , hN}. For reasons that will become apparent later,
such collections are called partitions. Instead of defining beliefs with probability
functions over a single observational algebra Q0, the Bayesian scheme defines
beliefs over the product of partition and observational algebra:
p[et] : H×Q0 7→ [0, 1]. (1.15)
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Here every hypothesis is associated with its own observational algebra, Hj =
{hj} × Q0, and its own direct predictions over this algebra. In this sense a
Bayesian scheme is really a generalisation of the Carnapian scheme. In section
2.5 it will become apparent that the Bayesian scheme can also be seen as a
special way of defining a Carnapian scheme.
In the Carnapian scheme, predictions are determined by a single prediction
rule, p[et](Q
q
t+1) = pr(q, et). In the Bayesian scheme, by contrast, the predic-










To make predictions, we therefore need the probabilities for all the hypotheses
Hj in H, denoted p[et](Hj), and the direct predictions associated with these
hypotheses, denoted p[et](Q
q
t+1|Hj). The remainder of this section makes these
two input components precise.
The direct predictions associated with statistical hypotheses are called the
likelihoods of the hypotheses. These terms are given by the probability assign-
ment over the observations according to the statistical hypotheses:
p[et](Q
q
t+1|Hj) = pr[hj ](q, et), (1.17)
The likelihoods of the hypotheses, which are defined for certain observations,
are thus the probabilities, according to the hypotheses, of these observations.
Note that every hypothesis represents a separate Carnapian scheme, and that
the Bayesian scheme takes a range of such schemes as input. Again, these
prediction rules are not restricted to the Carnapian rules, which may be derived
from applying the notion of logical probability to the observation language.
Hypotheses can be chosen freely, and so can the likelihoods associated with
them.
1.3.2 Probability assignments over hypotheses
The following discusses Bayesian updating over hypotheses. See Jeffrey (1984)
and Howson and Urbach (1996) for more details.
Updating over a partition. The probability over hypotheses after et, which also
figure in the prediction (1.16), require more elaborate discussion. These terms
are not immediately given, but they can be worked out by means of Bayesian







Figure 1.2: A graphical representation of an update of the probability assignment over the




, for the observation E1 = Q11. The areas represent the size of the
probability, the dotted areas represent those infinite sequences in which the next result is 1.
On the left we start with all sequences, E0. After observing q1 = 1, we zoom in on the cylinder
set E1 = Q11, containing all infinite sequences for which e(1) = 1. Within this cylinder set,
the probability for the next result being 1 is different, only because the probabilities over the
hypotheses have shifted.
updating, or Bayes’ rule for short. In the above framework, this rule can be
defined as a recursive relation between the probability functions p[ei] and p[ei+1],
p[ei+1](Hj) = p[ei](Hj |Qqi+1), (1.18)
in which q = ei+1(i + 1) is the last observation. The rule expresses that the
degree of belief assigned to Hj after observing ei+1 must be the same as the
degree of belief assigned to Hj after ei, conditional on the further occurrence
of qi = ei+1(i + 1). For this reason it is sometimes called conditioning. The
operation is illustrated in figure 1.2.
Let me elaborate on the use of Bayesian updating for the purpose of deriving
a probability assignment over statistical hypotheses. Some more general remarks
on conditioning can be found in section 1.4. For now, note that the conditional
probabilities in the foregoing can be written as follows:








This expression is known as Bayes’ theorem. It follows simply from the axioms
of probability. Thus, to compute the probability for some Hj relative to a data
set ei+1, we need the preceding probability assignment p[ei](Hj), the observation
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i+1|Hj) and p[ei](Qqi+1) defined for that set.
This allows us to trace back the probability over the hypotheses p[et](Hj)
to their likelihoods for the specific observations et and an initial probability
p[e0](Hj). As indicated, the probabilities of the observations p[ei](Q
q
i+1|Hj)
are assumed to be given with the hypotheses. Furthermore, the prediction
p[ei](Q
q
i+1) can again be written in terms of the likelihoods and the probability











Bayesian updating thus determines the probability assignment over the hy-
potheses p[et](Hj) on the basis of observations et, prior probability assignments
p[e0](Hj) and the likelihoods p[ei](Q
q
i+1|Hj).
Prior probability assignment. The probability assignments p[e0](Hj) are an ir-
reducible input component for making predictions in a Bayesian scheme. In the
same way as that we assume the likelihoods of each of the hypotheses, we must
therefore assume a prior probability assignment over the hypotheses themselves:
p[e0](Hj) = p(hj). (1.21)
Here Hj = {hj}×Q0 is a subset of H×Q0. Note that we must have p(hj) ≤ 0
for each j, and
∑
j p(hj) = 1. In other words, p is a probability function running
over H. The initial degrees of belief over the hypotheses, expressed in p, are
usually referred to as priors.
It is useful to distinguish between two separate aspects of choosing priors.
One aspect of it is that we allocate prior probabilities after we are given a
particular partition of statistical hypotheses. As will be argued, by allocating the
probabilities over a given partition we can express specific inductive knowledge.
Another aspect of choosing priors is in deciding what range of hypotheses to use
in the first place. In the example, the likelihoods are the prediction rules pr[h0]
and pr[h1]. Together with the prior probabilities p[e0](H0) and p[e0](H1), these
likelihoods determine the inductive predictions that derive from the Bayesian
scheme. By choosing the prior probabilities to be nonzero only for hypotheses
in the partition H = {h0, h1}, we determine which likelihoods play a role in
the Bayesian scheme. This second aspect of choosing priors, which concerns the
choice of possible statistical models, is therefore very important. It is discussed
at length in chapter 3.
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This chapter, however, need not invite discussion over the issue of choosing
hypotheses or priors. Recall that its aim is to present two schemes for making
inductive predictions, and to reconstruct these schemes in terms of inductive
logical inferences. The issue of choosing priors is important, but as explained
in the introduction of this chapter, the schemes as such cannot be expected
to offer any guidelines here. The choice of priors concerns premises in the
inductive logical arguments. Of course, it must be part of the development of a
logical scheme to elucidate how this notion of premises relates to bits of relevant
knowledge. Later chapters suggest tools for relating specific knowledge to the
choice of priors. But for now I leave it at the somewhat loose remark that priors
must be chosen to reflect initial beliefs and accord with relevant knowledge.
To sum up, in the Bayesian scheme the predictions p[et](Q
q
t+1) take as in-
put the prior probabilities p[e0](Hj) for every 0 < j ≤ N , and the likelihoods
p[ei](Q
q
i+1|Hj) for every 0 < j ≤ N and 0 < i ≤ t. The beliefs attached to the
hypotheses, denoted p[et](Hj), function as an intermediate state in determin-
ing the predictions. Degrees of belief over hypotheses are updated by means of
conditioning. Having obtained an expression for these degrees of belief, we can
compute the predictions p[et](Q
q
t+1) with equation (1.16).
Infinite partitions. An important refinement in the Bayesian scheme is pre-
sented by partitions with an infinite number or even a continuum of statistical
hypotheses, with which I shall now deal.
Consider the partition H = {Hθ}θ∈[0,1] in which the index j is replaced by
a variable θ over a continuum of values [0, 1] ⊂ R. The probability assign-
ments over the hypotheses p[et](Hj) then turn into so-called probability distrib-
utions p[et](Hθ)dθ, whose form is determined by the so-called density functions
p[et](Hθ). In the predictions (1.16), the summation over hypotheses must be









Further, Bayesian updating becomes an operation which transforms the density









In all other expressions, the index j must be replaced with the variable θ. But
apart from that, there are no changes to the update machinery.
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1.4 A logical picture
This section sketches a logical picture of the above schemes. It characterises
inductive arguments, assuming Bayesian updating as a rule of valid inference,
and introduces probability models as part of the input in both the Bayesian and
the Carnapian scheme.
1.4.1 Conclusions and inference rules
In deductive logic, to put it bluntly, an argument consists of premises, inference
rules, and a conclusion. Inductive logic, if it is to mimic this blunt picture of
deductive logic, must also consist of these three elements.
Notion of conclusion. On the notion of conclusion I can be very brief. Since
I am considering schemes for making direct predictions, the conclusions of the
inductive arguments are direct predictions, that is, probability assignments of
the form p[et](Q
q
t+1) = pr. The remainder of this subsection deals with the
inference rules. The premisses of the Carnapian and the Bayesian schemes are
dealt with in the next two subsections.
Inference rules. From probability assignments of the function p[et] we may derive
further assignments of that function according to the axioms of probability
theory. I propose to view these axioms as inference rules. The suggestion here
is that the axioms generalise the rules for classical truth values over a Boolean
algebra, allowing a continuum p ∈ [0, 1] of truth values where classical truth
values have p ∈ {0, 1}. This idea is strongly related to ideas in Ramsey (1921)
and De Finetti (1937). The axiom that p[et](U) = 1− p[et](Kω \ U) generalises
negation, the axiom p[et](U ∪ V ) = p[et](U) + p[et](V ) for U ∩ V = ∅ generalises
the operation of conjunction, and the axiom that p[et](K
ω) = 1 − p[et](∅) = 1
fixes the relation to Boolean truth valuations.
The above suggestions do not settle that we are dealing with a proper formal
logic, and the remainder of this thesis will not settle that matter either. For
one thing, the logical scheme is cast entirely in the language of mathematics,
and complications arising from that are simply left aside. Allusions to the
logical nature of the picture are here intended to convey a specific perspective
on inductive inference, while the logic itself is not spelled out in a formally
rigorous way. For a more elaborate treatment of these issues I refer to Cox
(1961) and Scott and Kraus (1966).
The above probability assignments p[et] are always relative to the same em-
pirical knowledge base et. Inductive inference must also accommodate changes
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in the knowledge base. It must allow for a representation of the addition of
certain premisses, namely the addition of observations. In the logical scheme
these additions can be seen as nonmonotonic inferential steps. The natural can-
didate for relating assignments with different knowledge bases is Bayes’ rule in
its general form:
p[et](·) = p[e0](·|Eett ). (1.24)
In the logical picture of this chapter, Bayes’ rule is the only inference rule that
links probability assignments with different knowledge bases. Note that the
above rule applies to all elements of the algebra H × Q0, both to hypotheses
Hj = {hj} × Q0 and to observations such as Qqt . But apart from that, the
above expression is equivalent to the expression of Bayes’ rule for hypotheses,
as introduce in the Bayesian scheme. Iterated conditioning of a probability
function p[et] on new observations Q
q
t+1 is just a shorthand form of conditioning
the probability p[e0] on a sequence Et+1 = Et ∩Qqt+1 in one go.
There are several arguments for the validity of conditioning, for example
in Birnbaum (1962) and Rosenkrantz (1992). To my biased eyes, conditioning
looks very natural: after we have observed Qqi+1, the probability for hypothesis
Hj becomes the probability we assigned to hypothesis Hj on the supposition
that this observation occurred. But the intuitiveness of conditioning is perhaps
illustrated best by considering it in the so-called cylinder algebra of section 1.2,
which resembles the muddy Venn diagrams of Van Fraassen (1989). The idea is
illustrated in figure 1.3. If we obtain the observation Qqi+1, we can discard all
possible worlds e in which e(i+1) 6= q, as we are sure not to inhabit any of those
worlds. We zoom in on the cylinder set Ei∩Qqi+1, which contains all the possible
worlds that match the knowledge base ei+1. The probabilistic expression of this
zooming operation is that we assign the cylinder Ei ∩ Qqi+1 a probability 1.
Within this cylinder set, however, there is no reason to change the probability
assignment any further. That is, the proportions of the probabilities within the
set Ei ∩ Qqi+1 must remain invariant under the zooming operation. In more
technical terms, the change in probability must respect rigidity. Conditioning
is the only operation that respects both these aspects of zooming in.
Criticisms against Bayesian inference. Despite its naturalness, Bayesian up-
dating has been subject to heavy criticism. It must here be noted that those
opposing Bayesian updating do not oppose Bayes’ theorem, expression (1.19),
which can be derived from the axioms of probability. The discussion concerns
the rule that links different probability assignments, expression (1.24), and the
claim that this rule determines how we must adapt beliefs to observations if




Figure 1.3: Illustration of conditionalisation. The areas represent sizes of the probabilities,
the dotted areas represent possible worlds in which the next observation result is 1. After
finding q = 1 at time t = 1, as represented by the observation Q11, we zoom in on those
possible worlds e for which e(1) = 1. New predictions can be derived from the probability
assignment within this patch of the cylinder algebra.
we want to follow a rule at all. First I want to set aside one important line of
criticism against this claim. It is sometimes supposed that conditioning cannot
accommodate certain modes of inference. As argued in Bacchus (1990) and Van
Fraassen (1989: 160-170), abduction is essentially at variance with Bayesian
updating. For this criticism I refer to chapters 3 and 9, which both challenge
the incompatibility claims.
Another criticism must be given more careful attention here. It contends
that Bayesian conditioning is irrational. In particular cases it seems to pre-
scribe unintuitive, irrational or even inconsistent probability assignments, as for
example in the discussion on the reflection principle in Van Fraassen (1989), in
the drinking and driving example of Maher (1993: 105-29), in epistemic logic
as discussed in van Benthem (2003), and in the sleeping beauty problem as
discussed by Elga (2000), Lewis (2001), Dorr (2001) and many others. Now it
must first be remarked that this thesis is not concerned with rationality. It is
not a problem that the proposed schemes for making inductive predictions fall
short of providing rational guidelines, as long as rationality is not actively pre-
cluded by the schemes. If we derive irrational conclusions by means of Bayesian
conditioning, this simply means that we had irrational starting points. Along
the same line, it is not immediately problematic that the results of updating
may violate intuitions.
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The real worry is that conditioning is inconsistent, because an inconsistent
inference rule can never yield a viable analysis of inductive inference. However,
the inconsistency results in the above example cases can only be derived in an
observational framework that allows for the expression of opinions about opin-
ions, or otherwise for curious events such as memory loss or intoxication. The
framework for observations does not leave room for opinions over opinions, or
for such drug-related circumstances. It can only incorporate observation events
and general observational hypotheses. In chapter 2 I shall come back to this,
when I discuss opinions about opinions in relation to a semantics for statistical
hypotheses. The general contention is that inconsistency of Bayesian condition-
ing can always be resolved by refining the algebra over which the subsequent
probability assignments are defined.
1.4.2 Probability models as premises
With both the conclusion and the inference rule in place, we can now turn to
the premises. This subsection deals with the premises in the Carnapian scheme,
which prepares for a discussion of Bayesian premises in the next section.
A probability model from direct predictions. Apart from the observations, the
input to the Carnapian scheme consists of a direct prediction rule. As will
become apparent, such a rule can be summarised in a so-called probability
model M, which consists of an algebra Q0, and a probability assignment over
this algebra, p : Q0 7→ [0, 1]. A probabilistic model is a 2-tuple
M = 〈Q0, p〉. (1.25)
In the following I first show that under the assumption of Bayes’ rule, any
prediction rule pr(q, et) can be derived from a single probability model. These
probability models can then be used as a formal notion for elaborating the
Carnapian scheme in full detail.
It is easily seen that direct predictions can always be derived from a single
probability model. Consider the Carnapian scheme, in which the direct predic-
tions are given as follows:
p[et](Q
q
t+1) = pr(q, et). (1.26)
Under the assumption of Bayes’ rule, we can write
p[e0](Q
q
t+1|Eett ) = pr(q, et), (1.27)
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and with the definition of conditional probability, this is equivalent to
p[e0](Q
q
t+1 ∩ Eett ) = pr(q, et)p[e0](Eett ). (1.28)
This is a specific restriction to the probability assignment p[e0], which may be
taken to underlie the direct predictions of pr.
I now show that the above restriction indeed determines a unique and com-
plete probability p[e0] = p, and thus a unique probabilistic model M over the
observation algebra Q0. Note first that the probability p(Et) for any et can be
determined by mathematical induction over t. We can use p[e0](E0) = p(E0) = 1
as induction base, and the above restriction, here written
p(Ei+1) = pr(q, ei)p(Ei), (1.29)
as inductive step. We can therefore determine the probability of any intersection
of two observation sets Qqt and Q
q′
t′ for t







Here Et−1 ⊂ Qq
′
t′ concerns all et−1 for which et−1(t
′) = q′. With this we have
defined the probability for all sets in the so-called pi system of observations,
which consists of all sets Qqi and all countable intersections of them. It is then a
theorem of probability theory that there is a unique extension of this probability
function to the algebra Q0 generated by this pi system, for which the reader may
consult standard textbooks in measure theory, e.g., Billingsley (1995: 36-44).
Under the assumption of Bayes’ rule, the Carnapian scheme can therefore be
said to take a single and complete probability function p as its input probability
p[e0]. That is, adopting a particular prediction rule pr(q, et) is the same as
equating the initial belief state p[e0] with a probability function from some model
M, and updating the probability assignments according to Bayes’ rule. Thus,
for the Carnapian scheme a single probabilistic model and the observations are
in fact all that is needed.
The Carnapian scheme. This leads up to the following reformulation of predic-
tions that derive from the Carnapian scheme in terms of a Bayesian inductive
argument:
◦ 1 p[e0](·) = p(·), a complete prior over the observation alge-
bra,
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◦ 2 et, some sequence of observations,
⇒ 3 p[et](Qqt+1) = p[e0](Qqt+1|Et), the prediction (1, 2 and Bayes’
rule).
By choosing the probability p appropriately, we may replicate any prediction
rule pr. The bearing that the observations have on predictions is encoded in
the probabilistic model, which is entirely under the control of the observer. In
chapters 3 and 7, I will come back to this aspect of inductive arguments.
The use of Bayesian updating may cause some confusion here. Notice that
Bayes’ rule is now intended as an inference rule. But in the foregoing it has
been presented as a rule for transforming beliefs on the occurrence of some new
element of data. It may be objected that a logical inference is not at all like
changing beliefs, but more like making explicit certain elements that are already
contained in the beliefs. The logical picture can therefore better work with a
single probability assignment to represent beliefs, and a notion of conditioning
that does not involve different probability functions. There is no need for Bayes’
rule, as opposed to Bayes’ theorem, in such a logical picture.
In the present context, it is more appropriate to work only with conditioning
on a single probability p: indexing every probability assignment with et is overly
elaborate. The second part of this thesis is in fact organised in that way. How-
ever, it may be taken as an attractive feature of the present schemes that they
express the addition of observations as a kind of nonmonotonic move. More-
over, I want the logical picture to leave room for inferential steps which cannot
be captured with conditioning alone. I employ Bayes’ rule in this way in order
to leave open the formal possibility of deviating from conditioning in linking
up probability assignments that have different knowledge bases. Chapter 8 will
return to this issue.
1.4.3 Multiple probability models
The Bayesian scheme. I now deal with premises in the Bayesian scheme. Again
the observations are part of the premises. The scheme further uses a whole
range of probability models p[hj ], and a prior probability over the hypotheses
Hj that are associated with these models.
The inductive argument is therefore more complicated in the Bayesian sche-
me. It concerns a derivation of probabilities in the algebra H×Q0:
◦ 1 ∀j : p[e0](Hj) = p(hj), a prior over hypotheses,
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◦ 2 ∀j : p[e0](·|Hj) = p[hj ](·), the likelihoods for each of the
hypotheses,
◦ 3 et, some sequence of observations,
⇒ 4 ∀j : p[et](Hj) = p[e0](Hj |Et), a posterior over hypotheses
(1, 2, 3, probability axioms, Bayes’ rule),
⇒ 5 ∀j : p[et](Qqt+1|Hj) = p[e0](Qqt+1|Hj ∩ Et), the updated
likelihoods (2, 3, probability axioms, Bayes’ rule),




t+1|Hj)p[et](Hj), the prediction (4,
5, probability axioms).
Note that the likelihoods and the posterior probability over the hypotheses are
both derived with Bayesian updating.
Some remarks are called for. First, note that we may use expression (1.18)
and the probabilities p[et](Hj) for computing p[et+1](Hj). The observation Q
q
t+1
is then incorporated in a new inductive argument, but this argument has poste-
riors from an earlier argument among its premises. Second, the Bayesian scheme
of section 1.3 leaves aside updates on likelihoods in order to present the Bayesian
scheme as a generalisation of the Carnapian scheme. But as part of the logical
picture, the likelihoods are updated after all, both in the Carnapian and in the
Bayesian scheme. Third, in the case that the hypotheses are associated with
constant predictions, as for example h0 in the hunting example, we have
p[e0](Q
q
i+1|Hj ∩ Ei′) = p[e0](Qqi+1|Hj). (1.31)
But there are also hypotheses for which the predictions do depend on earlier
observations, as for example h1. In that case the update operation affects the
likelihoods.
Logical arguments. One aspect of the logical picture concerns the Carnapian and
the Bayesian scheme equally: the use of probability models. It must be stressed
here that I do not take probability models as objective models, and also not as
complete or partial representations of beliefs actually held by some reasoner. A
probability model p is a premise in an inductive argument. It is a formal tool
for elucidating inductive schemes, and not more than that. Also, there is no
restriction that the probability model must somehow match the world. Leaving
aside reductios, the usefulness of the conclusion of an argument depends on
the truth of the premises, but the argument as such can be perfectly valid
independently of that. Probability models are thus similar to truth valuations
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or models in classical logic: it is not inherent to the use of models in classical
logic that they are accepted as true by some reasoner, and they need not match
the world in any way either. Premises are adopted, literally, for the sake of an
argument.
Another aspect of the logical picture must be mentioned here briefly. A
proper logic will advertise itself with a soundness and a completeness result, and
the inductive logical schemes here may be expected to provide such results too.
However, I have not developed the formal semantics of the schemes sufficiently
to provide these results. Chapter 2 will deal with some aspects of semantics, and
soundness and completeness results are sketched in chapter 7. But unfortunately
this thesis does not contain a proper treatment of the subject.
Finally, it is again notable that apart from the observations, the Bayesian
scheme consists of a range of input probabilities which are entirely free for choice.
There is no further restriction on what input probabilities may be rational or
acceptable. This aspect of the inductive arguments is of key importance to the
rest of this thesis. It is that both in the Carnapian and in the Bayesian scheme,
the observations do not determine what predictions are warranted. In choosing
the input probabilities we effectively determine the patterns in the observations
on which the predictions focus, but there is no restriction stemming from the
observations alone.
1.5 Normative aims
The foregoing has introduced two schemes for making inductive predictions.
Both of them use the observational algebra Q0 and probability functions p[et]
to characterise observations and beliefs respectively. However, there is a lot of
controversy over the framework of algebra and probability, especially when it
comes to representing beliefs by means of probability functions. In this section
I want to make clear how this controversy affects the current discussion. The
section may be left aside without impeding further reading.
Descriptive adequacy. Many arguments that are critical of a probabilistic frame-
work are concerned with descriptive aims. As such arguments go, a scheme for
inductive predictions cannot use a framework with probability, because human
reasoning cannot be adequately described in it. Experiments in cognitive psy-
chology, as recorded in Kahneman and Tversky (1982) and also Gigerenzer
(2001), show that humans do not reason in accordance with probability the-
ory. However, the aim of the schemes discussed in this chapter is normative
and not descriptive. And because the aim is not to represent human inductive
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reasoning as accurately as possible, it cannot be used as an argument against
the framework itself or against the schemes it facilitates that real humans do
not comply to it. To draw the analogy with deductive logic once again, there is
strong evidence for the fact that people do not reason in compliance with the
rules for material implication, which has been discussed in Wason (1968) and
more recently Van Lambalgen and Stenning (2001). But most logicians do not
see this as a reason to abandon classical logic as a normative theory of reasoning
either.
The normative aim of this thesis is to characterise valid inductive inference.
Put more carefully, it is to provide a scheme that describes inductive practice
as valid inference. Clearly, the form of the inference scheme may deviate from
practice, and in this sense the critical arguments mentioned above can indeed
be deemed irrelevant. However, the specific normative aim does make certain
considerations of descriptive adequacy relevant after all. To see this, imagine
that as a normative scheme of inductive inference I presented a cookery book.
This book is obviously inappropriate as a normative scheme, because inductive
inference is not at all like cooking. Now it is of no help here to state that the
normative theory need not be descriptively adequate. Indeed, actual inductive
practice need not be described adequately, but we do want the normative scheme
to provide norms for exactly those types of inferences that are exhibited by
actual inductive practice. In short, the norms must still be applicable to the
practice. Secondly, inspired on Earman in (1992: 56-7), it may be that inductive
logic is overplaying her hand when it devises a normative scheme that is so far
removed from practice that nobody knows even how to strive towards the norms.
Thus, both for the applicability of norms and for their attainability, the criticism
that the framework is not descriptively adequate cannot be ignored completely.
It is hardly necessary to illustrate problems that relate to the attainability of
the goals laid down by the schemes. Bayesian schemes in particular are notorious
for their computational intractability, and this problem is only partly solved
by the use of computers and computational tools such as Bayesian networks.
Nevertheless I feel that problems with the applicability of norms are potentially
more harmful to the aims of this thesis. In the remainder of this section I
want to illustrate two such problems. Neither can be discarded by pointing
to the normative nature of the schemes, and in both cases it must simply be
disclaimed that they are solved in the present study. A third problem is only
briefly mentioned, and discussed more elaborately in chapter 2.
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Applicability problems. First, it can be noted that the probability functions do
not capture all types of uncertainty that may be involved in reasoning. This is
because a belief cannot always be associated with a sharply delineated extension
in the possible world semantics. As an example of this kind of uncertainty,
consider the problem of logical omniscience. Imagine that we are given a Boolean
algebra, and are then confronted with an expression of five pages, which as a
matter of fact is a logical tautology. Since it is a tautology, probability theory
prescribes a probability 1 for it. However, if we see the five-page tautology for
the first time, it seems natural to feel some uncertainty over its truth. But
in such cases, we are not uncertain about the probability measure that is to
be allocated to the extension of the expression in the algebra. Rather, we are
uncertain on what the extension of the five page expression in the algebra is,
or in more common terms, we are uncertain on what the five page expression
means. This kind of uncertainty in beliefs is not captured adequately in the
probabilistic framework, because probability can be assigned to statements only
after the extension of the statement is given. The above schemes therefore do
not provide the norms for dealing with this kind of uncertainty.
Second, apart from the fact that the framework leaves a particular kind of
uncertainty out of the picture, the nature of the uncertainty that the schemes
are actually concerned with may not be captured adequately by the mathe-
matical notion of a probability function. This problem concerns the fact that
probabilities have sharp values within the real interval [0, 1]. One of the conse-
quences of having sharp values is that the uncertainties attached to statements,
or sets of possible worlds, form a complete ordering. But in actual cases, as
famously discussed by Keynes (1921) and later by Kyburg (1974), it may not
be true that any pair of observations can be compared with respect to the de-
gree of belief that we attach to them, even if we have some opinion on both of
them separately. It seems wrong to state this complete ordering as a norm for
reasoning with uncertainty, and thus to force this ordering onto our assessment
of uncertainty.
A third worry concerns the interpretation of probabilities as representations
of beliefs. Clearly, inductive inferences concern degrees of belief, and are thus
associated with epistemic, as opposed to physical, probability. If, for instance,
on the basis of data I assign a probability of 2/3 to the event that a tiger appears
next, this means that I consider it more likely than not that the tiger appears
next, and not in the first place that there is a tendency in the tiger itself to
appear with that chance. For all we know, the tiger may be perfectly determined
in all its hunting decisions. On the other hand, as will be seen later, this thesis
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also involves explicit reference to chance processes, in which the probabilities
are objective and connected to physical probabilities. For example, I may assign
an epistemic probability of 3/4 to the statement that the objective chance for
any tiger to appear directly after a duck is smaller than 12 . Chapter 2 argues
that both objective and epistemic probability can be given an unproblematic
interpretation in such a setting. But in the present chapter I cannot resolve the
tensions that may result from their simultaneous usage.
Disclaimers. Generally, I concede that there are mismatches between the present
framework and actual reasoning, and that the schemes therefore cannot present
a complete set of norms for inductive reasoning. However, it will be assumed
that these mismatches are not destructive to all the aims of the schemes. I
take the above considerations to show rather that the norms presented by the
schemes are not detailed enough, and that they are therefore not applicable
without further idealising assumptions. Such assumptions are similar to those
we may make when it comes to the applicability of laws of nature: even though
the conditions under which the laws function are almost never met, we still take
the laws to be applicable, and we say that the description in terms of laws is
incomplete rather than inapplicable.
1.6 Conclusion
Summary. The above presents a particular picture of the Carnapian and the
Bayesian schemes for making predictions. According to this picture, both
schemes accommodate new observations with Bayes’ rule, and both schemes
take probabilistic models and observations as input. For both schemes the log-
ical picture isolates a notion of conclusion, namely the predictions, a notion of
inference, namely that of the probability axioms and Bayes’ rule, and finally,
a notion of a set of premises, which consist of observations and probabilistic
models. These latter premises bring out the assumptions needed for making
inductive predictions. Thus the picture emphasises the logical nature of the
schemes, but it also highlights that the observations do not entail anything by
themselves.
The role of Bayesian inference. For anyone familiar with the pervasiveness of
Humean criticism, the fact that the picture leaves the inductive predictions
completely underdetermined will not be surprising. The import of the problem
of induction is not just that the data alone do not tell everything, it is more
that the data alone do not tell anything. One of the reasons for presenting
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the predictions as conclusions of the above arguments is exactly because these
arguments reveal the assumptions underlying the predictions, and bring to the
fore that these assumptions do all the inductive work. As already sketched in
the introduction, this may be viewed as an advantage offered by the logical
picture.
It is perhaps felt by some that not all the inductive work is done by the
assumptions in the logical picture. This is related to the criticism that Bayes’
rule, as used in the Carnapian scheme, cannot capture all modes of inference,
and that for example abduction cannot be captured by it. In the above picture,
this amounts to the claim that Bayes’ rule allows to derive more than the prob-
abilistic conclusions already implicit in the input probabilities. However, the
above discussion shows that any prediction rule pr(q, et) corresponds to adopt-
ing some prior probability assignment p[e0] = p, and the use of Bayes’ rule for
the inferences. This means that, at least on the level of inductive predictions,
the rule is not restrictive at all: any prediction rule can result from it. By the
same light, the rule is not restrictive in the Bayesian scheme either.
Dogmatic aspects to Bayesian inference. Once we have chosen a probability
model for the Carnapian scheme, or a prior over hypotheses and a set of such
models for the Bayesian scheme, Bayes’ rule fully determines the predictions.
This is similar to the case in deductive logic, where the inference rules do not
restrict the possible conclusions, while choosing particular premises compels us
to particular conclusions. Of the initial objection that Bayes’ rule introduces
unintended or even unacceptable restrictions, the core may very well be that
the rule forces us to choose a prediction rule at the onset, and to stick to it after
that. Certainly van Fraassen (1989) is concerned with this in his discussion of
Bayes’ rule. I must admit that it presents an unusually dogmatic aspect of the
flexible theory of Bayesianism that everything must be fixed at the start.
In reaction to this criticism, let me first remark that rule following is inherent
to all logical schemes. It therefore makes little sense to defend the above logical
schemes against criticisms that concern this rule following aspect. However, just
as in classical logic, there is no problem in deciding to start a new inductive
inference if the need arises, that is, to simply drop premises that have led into
useless conclusions and use the observations again in another inference. Chapter
8 proposes a formal model for a similar move, as an add-on to the Bayesian
scheme, but needless to say, starting a new inference may be perfectly rational
also if a formal model for such epistemic moves is lacking.
44 CHAPTER 1. CARNAPIAN AND BAYESIAN INDUCTIVE PREDICTIONS
Finally, let me address a worry that is strongly related to the dogmatism
that seems to be inherent in Bayesian logic. It is that in using this rule, the
conceptual work may be distributed inefficiently over premises and inference:
some other rule may allow for more readily applicable or easily accessible input
probabilities, or for a relation between premises and conclusions that more nat-
urally reflects inductive inference. In short, the innocence of Bayes’ rule may
come at a price. It is only in chapter 3 that I can present an argument to the
contrary.
Carnap versus Bayes. One final remark must be made about the relation be-
tween the Carnapian and the Bayesian scheme. As indicated, the Bayesian
scheme can be seen as a generalisation of the Carnapian scheme. The Carnapian
scheme takes only one probabilistic model as its input, whereas the Bayesian
scheme incorporates a range of models. To deal with this range, it allocates a
probability assignment over them, and updates this assignment over the models,
or hypotheses, just as it updates the likelihoods, or direct predictions, within
the models. But the Bayesian scheme eventually leads to predictions that can
also be captured in the simpler Carnapian scheme. Seen from this angle, the
Bayesian scheme may be nothing more than a useless complication. Again, chap-
ter 3 argues for the use of the Bayesian scheme in connecting relevant knowledge
with prior probabilities.
